Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem
Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil
| dc.contributor.author | Bobonis, Gustavo J. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Gertler, Paul J. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco | |
| dc.contributor.author | Nichter, Simeon | |
| dc.coverage.spatial | América Latina y el Caribe | es_ES |
| dc.coverage.spatial | Brasil | es_ES |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2019-09-03T15:42:11Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2019-09-03T15:42:11Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2019-01-31 | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Bobonis, G. J., Gertler, P. J., Gonzalez-Navarro, M., & Nichter, S. (2019, January 31). Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil. Caracas: CAF. Retrieved from https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1463 | en_GB |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://scioteca.caf.com/handle/123456789/1463 | |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Political clientelism is considered a fundamental reason why politicians are not accountable and responsive to their constituencies. In this working paper, we study whether transparency initiatives – more specifically, top-down anti-corruption audits – can reduce the incidence of vote-buying and political clientelism in the context of Brazil’s municipal government anti-corruption program. This program selected municipalities at random to audit municipal finances, which allows for causal inference. We combine the audit program data for a sample of municipalities in the country’s Northeast region with a dedicated longitudinal survey we conducted in 2011-2013 of a large representative sample of impoverished rural households. This enables us to estimate short and long-term effects of the government anti corruption audits on subsequent levels of vote-buying and political clientelism. | es_ES |
| dc.language.iso | en | es_ES |
| dc.publisher | CAF | es_ES |
| dc.subject | Corrupción | es_ES |
| dc.subject | Democracia | es_ES |
| dc.subject | Fortalecimiento institucional | es_ES |
| dc.subject | Gobernabilidad | es_ES |
| dc.subject | Investigación socioeconómica | es_ES |
| dc.subject | Sector público | es_ES |
| dc.title | Government transparency and political clientelism: Evidence from randomized anti-corruption audits in Brazil | es_ES |
| dc.type | workingPaper | es_ES |
| dc.publisher.city | Caracas | es_ES |
Ficheros en el ítem
Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)
-
6.1 Documentos de trabajo en investigación socioeconómica
En esta colección se encuentran los documentos de trabajo sobre temas económicos y sociales prioritarios para la región.
Items Relacionados
Estimating the nature of political corruption: evidence from a policy experiment in Brazil
This paper proposes a test to estimate the nature of political corruption in developing countries: embezzlement by self enriching politicians versus ...
Government performance, taxation and citizen participation: evidence from Brazil
Fiscal contract theories of the state hypothesize that government performance affects tax collection and that institutions that foster representation ...
Political constraints and state capacity: Evidence from a land allocation program in Mexico
In this paper we contribute to the understanding of the politics of state building. We emphasize that incumbent clientelistic parties might have incentives ...